A REINTERVIEW with Greg Ulmer, Part 3.

(No part of this reinterview may be published elsewhere without written permission from victor j. vitanza and greg ulmer.) --Copyright notice at end of each file, starting with September file.


The PreText Conversations held a Re/In/View

with Greg Ulmer about his Heuretics: The Logic of Invention

during September, October, and November of 1994.

The following file contains posts from the PreText Conversation's re/interviews with Greg Ulmer about his book, _Heuretics: The Logic of Invention_ (John Hopkins 1994). The posts included here appeared on REINVW@miamiu.acs.muohio.edu between 9-7 & 9-28-94.

Compiled by

Jim McFadden
Editorial Assistant
The Pretext Conversation

_________________________

Date: Wed, 07 Sep 1994 22:43:02 -0400 (EDT)
From: Greg Ulmer
Subject: glu -> vjv: heuretic dissertations

_____Do graduate students at Florida use heuretic methods in writing their dissertations?

The basic question concerns if and in what way I use heuretics in my own teaching. I have been using the CATTt heuristic for some time explicitly as a way to structure my classes at all levels. The required readings are selected to represent each of the slots (Contrast, Analogy etc). The courses confront some major problem at the beginning, and the assignments work through the stages of the CATTt leading to the design of a poetics or method to be tested as a solution to the problem. The mystory (in TELETHEORY) and chorography (in HEURETICS) were first worked out in my classes.

Students who like this way of working ask me to direct their dissertations, which tend to be organized as experiments in alternative approaches to academic research and writing. The experiments are justified by reference to the grammatological frame (the history and evolution of writing). What tends to happen so far is that the students spend much of their energy working through the historical and theoretical rationale for the experiment, and end up giving only a sample of the experiment (which is all I did in my books also). Since these projects break with some of the conventions of dissertations, we always have to go through a series of exchanges with the watchdogs in the graduate school. This problem goes back to the days when they kept changing < differAnce > to difference. So far the problem has been solved by a letter from me officially declaring that the odd formal bits are an indispensable part of the research. There has never been any opposition from administrators or colleagues (but then Florida has a very flexible program in general). My students who have graduated have gone on to revise their dissertations substantially, including elaborations of the experiments. It so happens that three of these projects are undergoing review at various presses right now.

As for hypertexts, a student who just graduated this year authored a hypertext related to his dissertation, but it was not directly part of what he submitted to the graduate school. Our approach at this time is not to trouble the graduate school with videos, hypertexts, photography and the like, even though our students work in these media. They submit the scholarly part of the project as the dissertation. Storyspace has not been the important medium at Florida that it is at Brown, but that might change now that we have our new computer lab. The circumstances surrounding that lab and its impact on our curriculum in general and my work in particular is a large topic which we might return to if anyone is interested.

The general issue related to this question concerns the publishability of experimental writing in the humanities disciplines. I have seen many calls for alternative forms and methods, but very few attempts to act on these calls. One complaint is that such work is very hard to publish. That does seem to be the case, but again hypermedia and the internet will change things significantly. The grammatological rationale for my experimentation has been the history of the language apparatus (the interlinked evolution of technology, institutional practices, and individual subject formation). Almost everything we do in the academy today was invented to take advantage of the capacities of print. This invention process needs to continue in relation to the new technologies of language and memory. To look to print to support the discourses of its own replacement might be expecting too much. The power of print in the academy will gradually (or maybe even rapidly) decline as the work done electronically increases in interest, sophistication. Think of how writing gradually replaced oratory as the basic medium and form of intellectual production. So will computing (?) replace print modes. My argument is that the forms and institutional practices for this shift remain to be invented.

GREG ULMER

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Date: Fri, 09 Sep 1994 09:38:13 -0500
From: "Geoffrey M. Sirc"
Subject: REINVW gms->glue: pedagogy
To: REINVW@MIAMIU.ACS.MUOHIO.EDU

Where this book is really brilliant, Greg, is in allowing us (entreating us) to think about text differently. As such, it is of course focused on method. But could you speak more about how you think this is a teachable method? My question (which is similar to Victor's last post) could be phrased as:

_____What is method and what is really style (or ethos or Ulmer)?

More explanation: What I respond to most in the book is the performative feat of the method. That kind of theoretical writing as associational set has always seemed an important compositional strategy to me. I would compare your method to the one the painter David Salle has used. Salle talks about the pop-imagery he draws on as his "vocabulary," his "inventory," and his method of juxtaposing images he has referred to as "rhyming." This seems very much what you're doing--the rhymes you ring on 1939, or the Geste/gest stuff, or method/Method, etc. Salle, too, has been influenced by films--in his case Sirk's melodramas. Your theme is very much Salle's theme as well: he speaks of the linguistic idea of "the obligatory" (that set within which we're able to think, speak and act) and he talks about his desire to "get outside of that, or to address the possibility of transcending that, or at least making it so painfully visible that you can think about what the world would be like if that weren't the case." Out of the impossible comes the possible.

But I can't imagine a painting class which tried to replicate Salle's style. Just as I can't imagine, really, how to teach the performative aspect of your method. So could you talk more about it? Victor has noted that you are trying to provide stepping stones to the chora, and I would echo that. It's like that recording group that was popular years ago whose thing was transcribing Charlie Parker's solos. It just didn't work. Imagine the dance-footstep diagrams to replicate a Fred Astaire solo; it would look like those print-outs I've seen of the bizarre link-screens (not sure of the term) for Storyspace stuff.

I asked above if it's not mixed in with an ethos, because so often it seems that much of your associational net (like Salle's) is deeply personal (even though it takes on very public issues). It is like one would almost have had to have the same textual exposure or background (both grammatological and ecological) to come to the kind of method you did.

A related question on the rhyming:

_____Why the reliance on the strictly historical in your associational rhymes?

Breton was writing at the same time Beau Geste was filming. So? Has this any importance (historically) other than the accidental? I know that you talk about the Surrealists' political responses, but isn't the reliance on conventional chronology limiting? It prompts great connections, of course, so it's a kind of chrono-tagmemic or something, but they seem inflected primarily by you--equally charged non-historical connections could be inflected too, no? Is it that the historical "accuracy" somehow lends them a patina of "truth"?

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Date: Fri, 09 Sep 1994 15:42:44 -0400 (EDT)
From: Greg
Subject: reinvw glue -> vjv: impossible

_____The relation of heuretics to kairos and the impossible?

1. Victor poses a question of considerable complexity. Before he could pose it he had to step back, to supply background, the story of how he came to think that question. I too must step back in a preliminary way such that I can scarcely begin to answer the question in this first response. Here I experience the pleasure of the protocols for this list, which allow for the suspense and digression of e-time/space.

2. This suspense allows me to interject a word of thanks to the hosts and participants on this list for spending time with my publications. I might add a word as well about what I think we are doing with this reinvw (what I want to do). I am learning how to perform in E. Electronic. My grandfather, Emanuel (Boss) Ulmer, built and ran the electric plant in Hazen, North Dakota, in 1914. He wired that very small town himself. Now I am wondering how to conduct the discourse of learning in the apparatus of electronic technology.

We are in a situation that resembles the circumstances Plato addressed when he invented the dialogue form. His question was: how to conduct the discourse of learning in the apparatus of alphabetic technology? He designed an interface to give himself and his students access to what the new technology could do. Literacy made analysis and synthesis possible--what was named < dialectic >. _Phaedrus_ is the first discourse on method, and what it shows us about method is as simple and profound as what Aristotle later showed us about narrative. When students read Aristotles _Poetics_ they tend not to appreciate the depth of the insight that dialectic made possible about tragedy: that all tragedies have a beginning, middle, and end. This insight was possible because Plato showed how method works: by breaking an object of study into its simplest parts (analysis) and then arranging these parts in a logical order (synthesis). The interface metaphor Plato used was the face-to-face conversation (Socrates chats with Phaedrus). The conversation was not one heard in everyday life; it was the sort of conversation held only in the new institution Plato invented to socialize the resources of writing: school.

3. The Q and A structuring this reinvw is the heir of the dialogue. The protocols of PRETEXT aim at assuring that the reinvw stays within the frame of dialogue (a cooperative search for the truth) and avoids eristics (flame wars). What interests me about this reinvw is the opportunity it affords not only to clarify what HEURETICS attempts to communicate, but which tests it in a way having to do with the project here of inventing a way to extend dialogue and dialectic into the electronic. Now here is my question, posed in the suspense of Victors question about the impossible:

_____does e-learning make interrogation as such (all Q A) counter-productive or irrelevant?

I want to discuss in my next installment of this answer comments about the authors Victor mentions. For now I will add the name of Page duBois to the list: TORTURE AND TRUTH. I have an article forthcoming in George Landows collection on theory and hypermedia on the need for inventing an alternative to interrogation, so I wont go into it here (and my one page of space is about gone). The idea is that interrogation is the means of inquiry native to alphabetic literacy, for better and worse, from Philosophy through the Inquisition to Expert Systems. In this transitional moment it is reasonable to continue with interrogation as an interface metaphor, to facilitate access to whatever it is that E makes possible (heuretics?). The historical relay suggests, however, that this interrogation should not resemble any that we are familiar with. SloterdijkUs CRITIQUE OF CYNICAL REASON makes interesting reading in this context. In my article I attempt to take up Seymour PapertUs suggestion of the Samba school as an alternative model for learning, in place of the Q and A. So Victor, you and I are dancing now, and the floor still has plenty of room...

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Date: Sat, 10 Sep 1994 16:36:14 -0400 (EDT)
From: Greg
Subject: REINVW glue -> gms: pedagogy

_____Is heuretics a teachable method or (only?) a style?

Sorry I missed the signature at the end of this question, so I am not sure who is GMS. When Plato invented method the challenge was to prove that morality was teachable. The skeptics wondered indeed if anything at all was teachable (_Meno_). The question for heuretics is if creativity is teachable (is creativity and method a contradiction in terms). The hubris of HEURETICS is to declare that I am playing Breton to Derridas Freud. What saves this otherwise absurd declaration is that it is offered as a claim that remains to be tested by folks on this list et al: that undergraduates can use heuretics to design and then apply original poetics without any more difficulty than they now experience using hermeneutics to compose interpretations.

I liked the Salle analogy. I extend it to say that the point of heuretics is not to copy someone elses style but to learn how to develop ones own style. Where TELETHEORY failed, apparently, was that readers mistook < Derrida at the Little Bighorn > for a product, even a (bad) work of art, instead of as a relay, a demo, of a method that requires extrapolation to ones own case to be functional. Mystoriography and chorography (first and second generation of the same thing) are an attempt to design a pedagogy that simulates the experience of creativity. Reviewing a number of studies of creative people, I noted that in every case innovators turned to metaphors or analogies from their personal experience or popular culture context for alternative interfaces that helped them overcome impasses blocking their fields of study. I wanted to give students the experience of the EUREKA that makes research so exciting, so pleasurable. Creativity happens when extradisciplinary personal peculiarities are brought into contact with disciplinary discourses in the context of problem-solving. In chorography I used the CATT (itself derived from an analysis of a sample of the key discourses on method in the Western tradition) heuristic to find an ANALOGY for teaching this projection of personal-private into public-collective material: the analogy is Method acting, in which the actor informs the lines of the public play with emotions found by doing memory exercises (cf psychoanalytic conversation). In principle then there is nothing impossible (hello Victor; still thinking about your question) about a hybrid private/public practice.

As for the step by step procedure of teaching this hybrid, I need to return to it in more detail another time (especially regarding the difficulties of the Tale, which requires a page of its own). The short version concerns the POPCYCLE (HEURETICS) (on the road I have done workshops that are a 90 min. version of the semester course): 1--note the 4 main discourses of learning we all practice (Family, Entertainment, School, Discipline); 2--locate a key figure associated with a problem in each discourse (simulates your superego); 3--enter information from each problem area; 4--look for puncept patterns in details across the 4 levels. That there will be such a pattern or repetition of some details is assured for the same reason all languages have puns: the sheer material ratio of few signifiers to multitudinous signifieds. Nonetheless, the effect of finding the figure in ones own carpet is EUREKA; the arbitrary crossing takes on the shape of what formerly suggested fate or destiny but which now has more of an aesthetic quality. I have given such assignments at all levels and a signature version of this line of work is included in the textbook TEXT BOOK (Scholes, Comley, Ulmer, St Martins Press). When students do such projects they do experience eureka.

The next step is to use the pattern as an _inventio_ for a disciplinary problem. I have done this myself, and used it in graduate seminars (not yet for undergrads). Example: taking as a proof of the value and relevance for me of the cheeky method of Diogenes (recommended in Sloterdijk, Deleuze, Serres) the pattern of GALL generated in < Derrida at the Little Bighorn >. This pattern logic (known as conduction) does NOT replace the other ductions that guide linking (for such is the function of logic), but supplements them. Which brings me to your second question.

_____the limited historical periodicity of the associational rhymes in chorography?

One of the pleasures of mystoriography/chorography (I need to sort these out later), using the combination of method and fortune (Hello again, Victor) is the surprises that emerge. The proof effect (as a logic of invention) comes from the method generating data that I would never have thought of otherwise. The challenge, once such patterns emerge, is to use the analytic operations of literacy to make sense of them (secondary elaboration). One such pattern that emerged in < Yellowstone Desert > (which, once you have read the book, you would pronounce deSERT) totally unexpectedly was the periodicity you noted. I am open to the achronos or non-historical linkings you mentioned, the Benjaminian messianic history an example of which might be Greil Marcus LIPSTICK TRACES. What happened in my case, however, was a parallel across modes and genres such that almost every thread I was working was relayed to me from the 1920s (Foreign Legion war in Morocco; Surrealism; Freuds , Stanislavski coming to America, BEAU GESTE, my parents childhoods...). That pattern poses a question that I have not had time to investigate yet: what is the temporality of the dissemination of ideas? Duchamp suggested that works of art had half-lives (the aura as radiation). I had this impression of finally comprehending 1920s thought in the 1990s.

Pattern, in any case, does give rise to a truth effect, in the manner of intuition. HEURETICS lays out a rationale for chorography as a way to write intuition, with the computer as the material support, similar to the way dialectic was a way to write analysis with literacy as the material support. The claim is that in the electronic apparatus the particular and the general, the local and the global, the personal and the public, the private and the collective--all will communicate or interact differently than they have in the apparatus of literacy. The paths or passages linking these levels in literacy are the paths of inference (deduction, induction, abduction). Hold on to these, but add to them conduction. Hence the further claim that STYLE is the place from which rhetoric begins to reclaim all the functions it lost to logic in the era of print (the struggle for cognitive jurisdiction recorded in the history of the trivium). Thus what seems impossible in one paradigm seems obvious in another (oops, did I answer Victors question by mistake?)

GREG ULMER

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Date: Sun, 11 Sep 1994 10:21:57 -0500 (CDT)
From: Hans Kellner
Subject: Re: REINVW gms->glue: pedagogy

I have just received a very interesting exchange in the REINVW sequence with Ulmer. The posting, however, makes no mention whatever of who might have written it. I have mentioned this matter before. Is everyone on the list able to recognise the others from syntactic peculiarities alone?

Hans Kellner

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Date: Mon, 12 Sep 1994 11:57:11 -0400 (EDT)
From: Greg
Subject: REINVW glue ->vjv: insane/impossible?

_____Is chorography an insane style and/or a sane pedagogy?

Victor is right to call attention to the parallels between the choral method and psychotic dyscourse. In my part of the introduction to GLAS (_Sounding the Unconscious_ in GLASSARY, Ed. John Leavey, Nebraska Press) I analyzed Derridas compositional strategy by comparing it to Lacans study of Schreber. The point of the Lacan chapter in APPLIED GRAMMATOLOGY was that Lacan himself in his lectures imitated neurotic and psychotic discourse, to put his students in the position of analyst listening to the analysand (this was Lacans solution to the problem of teaching a clinical practice in an academic setting: his answer to the problem of whether psychoanalysis was teachable). Freud was very defensive about the resemblance between paranoia and psychoanalytic interpretation, to which he himself called attention. Foucault said that Freuds most important discovery was of the logic of the unconscious. What the context of the history of invention allowed me to realize about Freud was that he made explicit what had been a buried part of every discovery of science/arts--the irreducible contribution of the personal life of the inventor (which is his link with Nietzsche).

_____why is chorography an impossible method?

Now Victor I can address the issue of the impossible method in this context: the Unconscious is an impossible concept. It is to culture perhaps what black holes are to astrophysics. Anyway, the form that my electronic rhetoric has taken is due in part to my having passed through film studies on the way. Film studies as you know is heavily involved with Freudo-Marxist-Semiotics, using Lacanian theory especially to describe and interpret film and cinema. This intellectual situation is the baroque result of the analogy that has been present from the beginning which is that film is (like) a dream. Psychoanalysis and cinema arose simultaneously and independently in the 19th century, but all that rises must converge, no? Whether or not film is a language, or is becoming a language, is much debated by makers as well as critics. From the point of view of grammatology, however, the historical parallel between the emergence of audio-visual recording in our era and the evolution of literacy is very strong. The multimedia equipment that is coming to our desktops (or is already there) allows the individual to make compositions that involve not only all the practices of literacy but also all the practices of cinema/television. Hollywood is the Pharaoh of film work; when writing was invented in Egypt only the Pharaoh could afford to use it. But it got cheaper. Movies are Pharaoh projects. But as interface designers are starting to realize, hypermedia design is more like making a movie than it is like having a conversation (hence the VITA in TELETHEORY: hybrid of AI and TV).

The point is that the logic of the unconscious (the condensations, displacements, priority of the signifier etc of dreamwork) is already the best description we have of the reasoning that is most adequate to the resources of sound-image media. Not the metapsychological in/de/ab-ductive reasoning of Freud et al explaining Schrebers or the Wolf Mans discourse but that discourse itself (or rather, psych is the grammar imposed on the latters natural language). Nor is there any necessary relationship between the clinical medical context in which this grammar was invented and the nature of VITA making, because if you examine the resources Freud drew on to establish his description you see that it comes from the poetic resources and practices of the ages. Chorography then involves the lifting of the psycho-filmic practice from its native contexts (medicine and entertainment) and an extrapolation to the context of schooling, where we need the equivalent of the St Martins Handbook for applying hypercomputing to learning. What happens when literacy is embedded in internet hypermedia computing? Well, what happened when orality was embedded in writing (that has been the interface metaphor for 2500 years--which is at the heart of hermeneutics)?

Chorography is an impossible method because in principle method is literate; the degree of invention grammatology calls for is at the level of method as such: Literacy : method :: hypercomputing :

_________? Which is why I started HEURETICS with the CATTt heuristic. Heuretics does not fill in the blank; it is a way to make the transition from method to whatever the blank might be that guides learning (which is not in itself medium or apparatus specific, OBVIOUSLY, n est-ce pas?) I consider grammatology to be a (an impossible) science in that it is open to testing the claims I am making. I do not know if I am right or not. the university is a place of research and the humanities has a big part to play in the new conditions coming into existence in relation to the electronic apparatus. The pedagogy we have been discussing is a way to test the hypothesis that educational practices in hypermedia will (by the standards of literacy) appear INSANE.

The test of a pedagogy and curriculum is that students experience real learning by means of them. A case relevant to the questions of both Victor and Geoff: the development of TEXT BOOK, which was field tested at UF (and at Queens and Brown). Take the 4th chapter especially. The fragments of a students discourse and the signature assignments. The readers for the press declared that the book was unpublishable and useless because graduate students could not do what TEXT BOOK expected of freshmen. I sent the press 30 papers or so-- a representative sample covering several years-- of signature assignments composed by Florida freshmen to refute the readers reports. The signature assignment is a good test for sorting out the categories we have been discussing--sane/insane, method/style etc. Derrida observed that the proper names of philosophers and poets recurred as common nouns and verbs within the themes of their work. That indeed there existed an isotopy across the levels from the authors name through the STYLE of the composition to the key ideas governing the METHOD (or poetic) The signature assignment assumes that this phenomenon may be extracted from its occasions in the performance of experts and adapted to learning for everyone; that it may be extrapolated from a possibly accidental manifestation of the logic of the unconscious into a predictive method for generating insights. The signature as an *inventio* is especially useful, even if the purpose of the *inventio* is simply to motivate the collecting of stuff to use. Argumentation has its own methods of invention that discover quite different stuff than does the signature.

My personal experience of using the signature to guide my research, and the evidence of student papers composed with the signature, is that researching in the manner of the psychotic Schreber (or of the surrealist artists--cf. Dalis paranoiac- critical method) produces a very strong learning effect. Again, the idea is not to replace argument with surrealism, but to create a hybrid. The CATTt suggests an initial way to explore this collaboration of literacy and hypermedia: the Contrast would be argumentation. In the computer lab we still assign a Handbook, but it functions as a CONTRAST rather than as a rulebook. That is the next assignment in my ENG1131 class (Writing With Popular Culture) this term: to compose a chapter for any existing Handbook that shows how to do a research paper using conduction, to be distinguished from the existing chapter based on argumentation. The ANALOGY for conduction is provided by Arieti, CREATIVITY: THE MAGIC SYNTHESIS, which gives a psychoanalytic account of the logic of creativity. The new edition of TEXT BOOK (available by this October or so) has a new chapter at the end that extends the signature assignment into a textual (mystorical) approach to the research paper. More about this later. GREG ULMER

Sorry these answers are getting so lengthy. Help! This one was two pages single spaced. Now Im making it longer...

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Date: Tue, 13 Sep 1994 06:26:41 -0400 (EDT)
From: Jim McFadden
dSubject: REINVW jmcf-> glu: A conservative method?

Fr: Jim McFadden (jmcf)
To: Greg Ulmer (glu)
____ Is conduction too limited, perhaps, too patriarchal a method for contemporary disciplinary needs?

I appreciate your recognition of the object-of-a-discipline's thrownness by its writers, and I agree that Freud stands as a well recognized case of the autobiographical investment in the maintainence and construction of the disciplinary object (blah, blah, blah). I see the movement you are advocating with CATTt as a method of invention, as I saw the earlier mystory. I also see what you mentioned in your response to Geoff, that some reviewers have mistaken the autobiographical content of mystory as a specific of the method rather than a specific of your own relation with your object's thrownness.

Yet, while I hesitate in part to raise a debate I ought to research more than I have and can presently, I am interested in asking about your take on the debate about whether or not electronic technology and method "are" patriarchal/conservative.

I am struck by the uncomplicated boosterism advocated in _Heuretics_, especially at moments of the book's interest in throwing. I see your conduction autobiographically. But the method too is historical, disciplinary, popular, and familial, hence I see it as conductive as you do, but I wonder also that the method's politics go unacknowledged, always deferred.

In your book, throwings are made:

1) by the Minnesota AIM leader, Vernon Bellecourt, who threw a pint of his blood on the sail of the replica of Columbus's ship when it visited at the Science Museum of Minnesota. It is his "gesture" you say you "want to recieve" in this book. [Do you "receive" it? How?]

2) by Red Cryer, your "village idiot" who throws a piece of litter, some cardboard, off a bridge into the wind which throws it back into his face repeatedly. His throwing you see as postal, mythical, and a lesson.

& 3) by the clown who throws a pie in your face to disrupt your presentation at Miles City which becomes apparently (but not as substitute?) this book.

Clearly, you announce your assumptions as patriarchial in the second half of the book, but I am interested in the presumed ease of conduction those assumptions are allowed in your method. Is conduction not inherently conservative as a methodology? For example, what is the function of the method's employment of familial, popular, and disciplinary discourses as the voices of the conducting subject? How could a method that "employs" Lacan's "Schema L" not be patriarchal? And, similarly, how could a method that voices uncritically the popular, the familial, the disciplinary not be patriarchially conservative? What is the popular function of your conduction to us of these throwings by the Native, the "idiot," and the clown? In what way, do you receive resistance by conducting those resistances as follie? Is conduction too limited, perhaps, too patriarchal a method for contemporary disciplinary needs?

Are there not accompanying metaphors that illustrate the overt politics of your method in a manner reminiscent of the critique of ethnography. Forgive my incomplete understanding of electronic technology but what might be the value of using "resistor" rather than "conductor" as a metaphor for your method? What does your method resist? Having put down the resistance to autobiography in the construction of disciplinary objects, does your method yet function to resist appeals like those made by AIM, that is by the "unpopular" or "nonpopular"?

Jim McFadden
Miami University
jmcfadden@miavx1.acs.muohio.edu

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Date: Tue, 13 Sep 1994 10:29:47 -0500
From: "Geoffrey M. Sirc"
Subject: REINVW gms->glue: credibility
To: REINVW@MIAMIU.ACS.MUOHIO.EDU

_____How do we establish credibility for table-work-as-text?

Greg, the talk so far has been (from Victor & I) very positive, enthusiastic, as to the kind of text resulting from your method. Your invention is the kind of invention I want, a *derive* through texts and lives and places. Intuitively, it feels right; textually, it reads great. We've spent a little time talking about how to try to teach such a method (and yes, I would like to hear about your computer lab), but can we talk about how to actually give such texts real force in larger university settings. Bove, in his article on "Theory as Practice" (in _Works & Days_, Fall 1990) declares that "Our task as teachers is to do whatever we can to let institutions hear what students and others know, even though they often are saying it in ways the normative order of disciplines cannot hear" (19).

Your method, Greg, is a powerful one for allowing students to drift through (or across) disciplines at their own speed, to go where they want; letting their own flaneurian trace count as text. It validates any point of attraction, and de-privileges any point of repulsion (no matter how canonical). In short, it satisfies Bove's call for circumventing "the ways in which students' and others' expressions of need and desire are blocked by a constantly adjusting system that tries to freeze their expressions and direct their energies and desires in ways they have had no part in choosing" (20). Your Method lets them choose (star in) their own Parts, reject certain Scripts in favor of others. Students become their own Agents.

Now a story I just heard from a colleague who is going to address new TA's here at Minnesota. She is going to tell them about a TA she had in the late 60's (circa Bill Coles) who asked the class one day if they minded if he taught class that day in the nude, since he was very comfortable in his body and he thought there was a real pedagogical effect to be gained. No one in the class objected (so it kind of passes the Iowa "unusual or unexpected" test). But when the administration found out, they committed the TA to a psychiatric institution. This story, then, is in keeping with our discussion of sane/insane pedagogies. I could imagine Macrorie or Coles (and even myself on a really good nude day, as Stallone calls it) teaching according to such a method. I could more easily imagine myself pushing my already stretched notion of academic essays in the direction of conduction/chorography, making the body of the writing itself more naked. But Ulmer's version of such writing is more academically impressive, of course--more traditionally cited, more analytical--than my students' would be.

So how do I become more intuitive, count more table-work as college writing, and not get taken to the metaphorical looney bin? Because at this place, people in other departments actually ferret out the identities of their students' composition teachers, see what grades they got, and complain about how students that can't write a coherent history paper got a B in first-year composition. Then they call a series of confrontatory meetings to find out "just what you're teaching those students over there in your writing classes . . ."

Geoff Sirc

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Date: Wed, 14 Sep 1994 10:57:26 -0600 (CST)
From: CGB1046@UTARLG.UTA.EDU
Subject: REINVW cgb->glue: invention (sub)versus ?
To: reinvw@miamiu.acs.muohio.edu

Rather than asking a question and backtracking to explain where I'm coming from, I'd like to explain where I am and see if I can pull a question out of it. I want to play off vjv's question about invention vs. style, but I have, I think, different sources of possible dis/ease.

In Part II of _Teletheory_, you discuss the joke as particularly attractive for your "project designed to integrate the cognitive styles of justification and invention" (55). In the pages that follow, in describing the cognitive process of jokes, it seems to me that you suggest (especially in your analysis of Koestler's "bisociation of ideas") that what we generally call "creativity" is not so much a radically different way of thinking as it is a subset of a broadly-conceived theory of invention, a subset which has been separated and had been largely forgotten in the same insitutional procedures which divided off and privileged "left-brain activities." [This is not problematic for me--just preamble-matic...]

One of the things I've been working with is the notion of catachresis, which might be loosely defined in much the same way as creativity, although definitions vary widely from source to source. I'm thinking of it in the same way that koans are used pedagogically in Zen Buddhism, or at least in certain sects. One of the walls that I run up against periodically is that, when koans or catachretic techniques are applied, there needs to be an uneven relationship between the teacher and taught. That is, in order for me to know what will be catachretic for my student, I have to know what s/he knows and more. What is catachretic for the student may not be so for the teacher. Catachresis as a trope is not value-neutral (cf. Patricia Parker's historical analysis to that effect in _The Ends of Rhetoric_, ed. by Bender/Wellbery, Stanford UP, '90). It [catachresis] inscribes an asymmetric relationship between the person and the material, in the same way that a joke doesn't affect the teller as it does the listener.

I guess my initial question is this: _____to what degree is the "Eureka experience" metaleptically inscribed in the heuretic process you describe?

Does heuretics set up boundaries, work to fix students within them, and then set up a program which simulates their aleatory transgression? Which is the long way of asking whether or not heuretics creates "true" eurekas, or simulated ones (without necessarily preferring truth to simulation). I want to keep going, and ask whether eurekas themselves are inscribed in our culture by precisely the type of left brain-right brain separation that you spoke of in _Teletheory_. Is the concept of invention as it's currently understood in American culture a function of our particular style? That is, because of our focus on the individual, our emphasis on frontierism, etc., have we created a "false" theory societally which inscribes the "pleasures" (and subsequent rewards in the form of authorship, patents, etc.) of invention on what should be natural results of a broad-ranged, open mind?

This may do little more than to bring me back to the question you raised about the possible oxymoron lurking in a "method of invention." But to ask that question (or to deal with any oxymoron) is to grant some type of solidity to the notion of invention, and I'd rather hear your thoughts on the matter. Nor is this a critique of the method itself, which I've enjoyed (both in reading _Heuretics_ and teaching from _Text Book_).

Saving that for later,
Collin Gifford Brooke
CGB1046@utarlg.uta.edu

============================

Date: Thu, 15 Sep 1994 13:59:32 -0500
From: Geoffrey Sirc
Subject: REINVW gms->glue: disciplinary discourse
To: REINVW@MIAMIU.ACS.MUOHIO.EDU

_____Circuits between Discipline and Entertainment?

Let's talk a little bit about John Cage. There's one thing I want to talk about regarding Cage that I hope will advance our discussion of Greg's book. It has to do with the content and style of Cage's prose. Reading Cage is incredibly pleasurable for me. At the same time it's very enlightening. Often when I read Cage, I feel that there is nothing else to say, that theory can't go any further, can't deal with anything more significant. And I bet that Glue feels the same way about Derrida. But there's a big difference between Cage and Derrida, I think. Maybe it's a question of the difference between European and American. Cage spent a lot of time in his writings thinking about how to distance himself from the European tradition, and indeed there's something strongly American about Cage, his sense of plain-ness, open-ness, self-invention, democratic materialism. But I don't want to get into a European vs. American thing, Cage is as Eastern as he is American, and I would never fault Greg for his Francophilia. But where I see it as an issue here is (in his reading and writing) Greg's reliance (which you don't find in Cage at all) on dense, rare, privileged, undemocratic texts (even though they may be tremendously liberating for an individual reader/theorist like himself). Greg takes off from Brecht to allow him to read Wren and Derrida together, citing this rationale: "The gap separating the discourses of Discipline and Entertainment has to be crossed in both directions. The point is not to reduce one to the other but to open a circuit between them" (102). Why is that the point? Doesn't that ultimately privilege Derrida over Wren, Derrida as helping explain, lending interpretive force to, inflecting the naive text of Wren? Which has more scholarly cachet? Is there a "Wren" list on the Internet? Why isn't the point to reduce any distinction between the two (hence, championing the already accessible rather than the discipline-one that presumes so much investment of time and labor)?

Cage's life was steeped in invention. His father was an inventor. He spent his whole life inventing a method, a tradition of composition, and writing about that invention. It's a method worth comparing to Greg's, since it's so similar. Does Cage think about the impossible? "We musT do the impossible," he said. His whole rational for composition is "to hear the music [he] hasn't yet heard," to look for "something [he] hasn't yet found." Why do the impossible? For Cage, it comes down to his belief that "revolution Can/nEver/Stop" (_X_, 151). In _I-VI_ he wrote about his performative philosophy: "the performance of a piece of music can be a metaphor of society of how we want society to be [breathe] though we are not now living in a society we consider good we could make a piece of music in which we would be willing to live." Take his piece _Musicircus_ which he outlines as "maNy/Things going on/at thE same time/a theatRe of differences together/not a single Plan/just a spacE of time/aNd/as many pEople as are willing/performing in The same place/a laRge/plAce a gymnasium/an archiTecture/that Isn't/invOlved/with makiNg the stage/dIrectly opposite/the audieNce and higher/Thus/morE/impoRtant than where they're sitting/the resPonsibility/of Each/persoN *is*/marcEl duchamp said/To complete/the woRk himself . . . theRe will be too many musicians/to Pay/thE/eveNt/must bE free/To the publis/heRe/As elsewhere/we find That/socIety needs/tO be/chaNged" (X, 141-142). I think Greg wants these things--electronic writing in which we are willing to live, a better society than we have now (e.g., he wants to re-write *geschlecht* in Cornel Westian, Musicircusian terms). But here too I would question whether Greg's dense-ness fights his revolutionary message. Who will pick this book up and read it and have their life changed? Who will want to live in it? The possibility is there, but the probability? Scholars, yes, might want to teach in it, and they might relay the message, the revolutionary force, to students, etc. But I urged this book on a colleague in journalism who came very close to stopping after the first few pages. This is unreadable, she told me. Isn't framing the debate in such specialized terms antithetical to the powerful force of invention you want to theorize? I'm in no way singling you out, I think your prose is much more readable, more playful, than some, but what I'm trying to do is question the inevitability of disciplinary discourse.

My question, then, is: Why maintain the distinctions between discourses? Why do we want to recicrculate such rarefied, thoroughly specialized, academic texts as Derrida? I dream of a world where we don't need Derrida (or Cage for that matter). But I can't help but think Cage would get more of us there faster. Cage claimed his philosophy was "get out of whatever cage you find yourself in," and do we want to think this pertains to everyone but us? Isn't Derrida a cage? Plato? I'm reminded of a conversation I had with a colleague in San Diego at 4Cs, on our responses to Victor's speech on the C's. My colleague's reaction was "My millworker friend wouldn't understand it. It's a Faberge egg." Now, specifically this is a bullshit comment cause my colleague reads/uses trendy high-toned theory exclusively, stuff most millworkers would probably pass on. But I think the criticism is a good one. It's the spirit of, say, Patricia Williams' comment about how she read all this theoretical stuff and it changed her life, but she couldn't imagine the average reader (whose life might really need changing) reading it. So her book consciously avoids citing it, theorizing instead articles and anecdotes from the NY Times. I think here we can learn from the situationists, who spoke in some high-toned texts to be sure (Debord's _Society of the Spectacle_, e.g.), but who also knew the benefit of striking with millworkers and so who knew how important it was to work in genres like grafitti and leaflets and parody and film soundtracks (_On the Passage of a Few Persons etc._). Now, the claim could be made that Cage (by now) is an academic text too (who else but those in the academy read Cage anymore)? But back in the days, a whole bunch of people read Cage. I think we would do better in getting more people to read thoery, to entertain the crucial questions about life today embedded in the best of theory, if more Gregs wrote more in the style of "Metaphoric Rocks," maybe, than the denser parts of _Heuretics_). Greg, you should be a movie critic or a TV critic, writing your theory in the guise of popular culture crit--i.e., going all the way away from the discourse of Discipline, into the discourse of Entertainment, fusing them rather than bridging them. No more distinctions between Nations/Discourses!

Geoff Sirc

============================

Date: Thu, 15 Sep 1994 18:18:12 -0500 (CDT)
From: GILLESPIEP@VMS.CSD.MU.EDU
Subject: Reinvw pfg -> gms Reading Heuretics
To: reinvw@miamiu.acs.muohio.edu

Geoff, I have to respond not to what you said, but to what your colleague in journalism said about Heuretics: that it's unreadable. Generally I agree with you about accessibility. I like Terry Eagleton better than Julia Kristeva, because one is trying to be understood by me and the other seems not to be. But my reading of Heuretics was a pure pleasure, even though I have more in common with your millworker when it comes to reading texts on invention than I do with your journalist friend.

When I finished the book I felt a distinct urge to start over; to remind myself what claims glue had made in the opening and to see how he defined his terms. But I also simply wanted to reread it, just for the fun it gave me. But there were two friends of mine lined up to read it when I finished, so I handed the book over. One, Jim Krause, who was part of the NEH summer seminar on Ezra Pound, cited the book in his final presentation, and used it in its preparation.

I had the advantage over your journalist friend of looking forward to the reactions of others to fill in those parts of the book I didn't understand, not that they weren't clear, but because I don't have the background. There's something really motivating in reading together, and knowing there will be discussion afterwards. Heuretics made me smile a lot, burst out laughing occasionally (to the amusement of the taciturn German tourists who populate the Tyrol) and think. Just as I wanted to go the exhibits of the fictional artist in Atwood's _Cat's Eye_, I wanted to see the tableau vivant and watch the reactions of the crowd.

Paula (Pollyanna) Gillespie
gillespiep@vms.csd.mu.edu

============================

Date: Fri, 16 Sep 1994 12:32:44 -0500 (CDT)
From: Nicholas O Pagan
Subject: questioning deconstruction
To: reinvw@miamiu.acs.muohio.edu

"It is better to approach 'deconstruction' by means of usage rather than definition," says Greg.

Derrida has been repeatedly asked to define what the term "deconstruction" means. Seemingly frustrated by society's need for a definition he has dismissed this importuning with the statement, "it just happens." "Deconstruction just happens." He also says though that "It's not only a way of reading texts in the trivial sense; it's also a way of dealing with institutions."

Let's ask some questions. How much deconstruction does Greg need to teach before he can get his students to do things with deconstruction? Does he conflate the terms "deconstruction" and "grammatology"? Is applying grammatology, applying deconstruction or is it applying a part of deconstruction? This in turn begs the question: can deconstruction be divided into parts? (for example, 1. take apart 2. put back together in a new and hopefully ingenious way)

I'm currently involved in looking at the relationship between deconstruction and institutions especially the institution of pedagogy. As an English teacher I am obviously involved in interrogating literary texts, but although careers are constantly being constructed with this project in mind doesn't the activity of endlessly interpreting canonical and non-canonical texts (the hermeneutic project, I suppose) need to be seriously questioned? Is it ethically sound to just do it? Obviously Graff, Lentrichia, and others are already examining these issues, but let's spend more time looking at the institution that surrounds most of us, that is to say the pedagogical institution. Deconstruction then, according to Derrida, can help us to read the institution--presumably not just the academic one but other institutions too. This brings me to my last question, the one that follows--Can deconstruction ever be separated from institutions or isn't it always already inherently institutional?

============================

Date: Fri, 16 Sep 1994 15:24:18 -0400 (EDT)
From: Greg
Subject: REINVW glue ->jmcf: A Conservative Method
To: reinvw@miamiu.acs.muohio.edu

_____Is chorography too patriarchal for the needs of contemporary disciplines?

I substituted for in Jims question because the way I use the terms conduction is a logic but not a method. Jim is right to want to open up that metaphor however so I will come back to it. (Jim, I saw your note about changing the spelling to < chorAgraphy>. A great idea; wish I had spelled it that way. I was intent on the paleonymic strategy of taking over a word already at work, as is in geography, but the *A* resonates obviously with the *A* of differAnce, which I used to spell with the capital letter. So lets start spelling it chorAgraphy).

1. Jim poses the hot-button question. What about politics? This question is extremely important and takes us into issues that I find very confusing, perplexing, troubling, about which I have a great deal of ambivalence and uncertainty. We are in the zone of the end of the Enlightenment problematic (Lyotard-Habermas debate etc). My work is committed to testing the poststructural version of this situation, to see where that might lead (I will try to account for this bet or choice briefly in what follows).

To put the question of conservativism or patriarchality in perspective I have to step back from conduction and even choragraphy to method itself. Method as such is an invention of patriarchal Western civilization. Radical feminism, represented by the early Laura Mulvey, went through a phase of reasoning that narrative as such had been totally colonized by the patriarchal and therefore progressive authors had to give up the pleasures of the text, abandon the seductions of storytelling, and find alternative forms for creative expression. As fruitful as such avant-garde experimentation has been, most folks have abandoned that extremism to argue that giving up narrative as such is giving up far more than is necessary: there is nothing inherently conservative or progressive about narrative.

The same sort of reasoning might be applied to method as such: JimUs question is in fact: is method as such too patriarchal, too conservative, for contemporary disciplines? I suggested in a previous post here that one project for heuretics is to find the other of method. What distinguishes the case of method from the case of narrative is that narrative crosses all apparatuses, while it is not clear that method as we understand it existed in a truly oral civilization. This point needs much more discussion: The history of dialogue shows that Plato drew heavily on the rituals of the Eleusinian mysteries for articulating his invention, and there is plenty of other evidence to suggest that ritual is to method as epic is to novel. In short, every apparatus has its specific practices of discourse: story, argument, poetic--which may serve any politics whatsoever. As Alexander Kluge as argued about the German lesson, the left abandoned all too quickly the ground of myth and story to the right (it let the devil have all the good tunes). That was a fundamental mistake not to be repeated. PROBLEM: critique is hopeless as a means for working with myth. To extend this hopelessness to the context of the apparatus: discipline itself is an invention of literacy and totally dependent on method: to be a discipline by definition requires a discourse have a methodology and an object of study. These elements are the sine qua non of being a legitimate part of the institution of school. But wait: school is an invention of literacy. In short, it is not possible for one part of the apparatus to change in isolation leaving everything else in place. Discipline as such is in no position to evaluate its own foundation (this is the remainder that Derrida et al insist on taking into account). Jims question could be reversed:

_____Are the needs of contemporary disciplines too patriarchal, too conservative, to be relevant to the problems of electronic culture?

2. Stopping at this point would be too easy, for it ignores the more specific levels of the problematic. If method or discipline as such are not too patriarchal (or maybe they are?), then what about choragraphy? If the problem does not lie with method, then heuretics may be used to design a poetics/rhetoric that is more progressive than choragraphy. I wanted that option in HEURETICS precisely because I am uncertain about the politics and ethics of choragraphy myself. At this level (the second layer of the question), I have to disagree with JimUs characterization of the boosterism in < Yellowstone Desert > as UNCOMPLICATED. Jim is right to worry about uncomplicated boosterism and about what appears to be the EASE with which conduction passes across borders of the popcycle, all of which risk an UNCRITICAL voicing of the different registers of discourse. These are serious reservations, given the climate of opinion currently organizing cultural studies, so it is well worth trying to sort out the poststructural gambit (which is how I understand the positioning of choragraphy in the triangular debate among humanists, deconstructors, and marxists-the labels, however unfortunate, that have evolved as names for the camps).

Rather, choragraphy may have a political effect, but it does not have an established politics. It does not start out with an assumption about what is true and right and beautiful, but it is designed to discover the premises, the assumptions about these values and concepts actually functioning in the inventors subjectivation (identity formation). The idea here is that these premises are often buried and go unrecognized in most politics. A politics may not be taken at its word as to whether it is progressive or conservative. Methods are political in that they have ideologies. Althusser claimed that a certain marxism was exempt from this limitation (this area of blindness) but his alternative was science. Critique is now doing to science what it once did to religion. As powerful as critique is (to use that term as a shorthand for what passes now as a method that would supposedly not be described in the way Jim describes choragraphy), its premises are literate, which is why it is inadequate for electronic reasoning.

What do I mean ? Simply that critique, like all versions of modernism, assumes it is possible to hold apart the different areas of experience and discourse such that one may treat another in an uncomplicated way! (eg that critique may tell the truth about myth). Take boosterism for example. The heuristic of the popcycle is to try to overcome the separations into essences of modernist institutions and achieve a more wholistic portrait of ones cultural position. When I juxtaposed the discourses within which my thinking and writing take place, I recognized that the boosterism that I intellectually had learned to condemn in my personal family or quotidian discourse (the merchants of Miles City promoting the local opportunities for doing business), was operating equally strongly in school practices. That was not too hard to see. More importantly, I realized that the disciplinary methods of cultural studies are as committed to boosterism as any merchant or football coach.

Why? Althusser said that all the institutions of a society serve the interests of the state ideological apparatus. Whether or not it has to be that way is another question; the popcycle juxtaposition shows that he is even more right than he realized, since for a time discipline was crowded with Althusserians (fans of Althusser). I am a fan of Derrida. I dont mean *fan* in an uncomplicated way, however. Rather, the theory of mourning helped me understand my fandom. As you know, mourning is the psychoanalytic poetic way of describing the entry into language. I have argued that all the dynamics of the entry into language (everything to do with the formation of superego and its operations in identity) provide the relay for every future specialized language that we add to our repertoire (in the way that the superego or mourning process adds to the parental figures other authorities with whom we identify). The interest of the theory of mourning is that it includes the operations of the unconscious in all behaviors of modern citizens. Part of the argument of HEURETICS is that the computer is the support of the unconscious--it augments what has bee theorized in the name of this term and makes that process--conduction-- available as a practice. In these terms the condition of modernism or critique in which the divisions of society are kept apart is a condition of blocked mourning (making the case of postwar Germany exemplary for all modern states). In short the problem of modernist society is not the ease of movement through the popcycle but on the contrary the resistance to such flow caused by our institutional formations (constructed in the same way as concepts--a yes-no, inside-outside, included-excluded, proper- improper). As for the electronic metaphor, then--Lacan used the image of the resistor--of the filament in the lightbulb to be exact- -as an analogy for the ego. In this electronic allegory for logic, conduction is the primary process circumventing the critical police of the ego (defense mechanisms). In this sense Jim is right to call conduction specifically uncritical.

I have been speaking in general terms. On an individual level, the problem I have with some of the persons who practice critique is that they seem to be unaware of the omnipresence of boosterism in all discourses: they practice critique in an uncritical way. That is, they are not very self-critical. They say all the *right* things (progressive things--I guess it depends on which crowd one hangs out with) but their behavior contradicts their words. *disfairance* is a way to check saying against doing, not only in writing but in behavior. I have read and heard respected folks declare themselves to be < with the homeless in the streets > (etc) but who do nothing other than publish disciplinary books about this question. It is just too easy to say such things, if nothing follows from it other than the improvement of ones own career. It does not make what is said less true in itself, but it raises the specter of the right hand not knowing what the left hand (or brain) is doing. It leaves untouched the question of how to make these progressive ideas effective in the conduct of life. Which brings us full circle to the impasses of the Enlightenment, in that < contemporary disciplines > are losing confidence in progress as such. Knowledge may not help. Choragraphy, finally, is a method for self-critique; it is precritical or preliminary, as a means to map what otherwise eludes conscious critical thought: ones own premises--understood now in terms of the unconscious, which is understood in turn as the symbolic order. Every political method is an enthymeme (its major premise is suppressed).

3. I come now to the third register of the problematic: If method in general and choragraphy in particular are not in themselves inherently too conservative, it may still be the case that < Yellowstone Desert > or Ulmers own practice is too conservative or patriarchal to be of any use to contemporary disciplines. This charge (if it is a charge) may well be correct. When I said in HEURETICS that my eureka moment was not very pleasant, I was referring to the fact that choragraphy had forced me recognize in a fundamental way what intellectually everyone should know anyway--you can take the person out of the country (city, whatever), but you cant take the country out of the person. When I found the Sand & Gravel company in *Chora* I realized that a lot of ideological baggage I thought I had educated my way out of was still with me (identity as overly competent baggage handler, always forwarding ones past).

Choragraphy also suggests that identity is not destiny (to borrow a phrase). My autoportrait with popcycle shows that my subjectivation is as patriarchal as can be. At the same time, the historical context shows that this outcome is entirely predictable (to show any surprise at it would naive, as if it were amazing that I am a native speaker of English). The key to choragraphy is that it helps its user to map the domain of TASTE, judgment, intuition. I do not identify with Custer intellectually, conceptually, politically in that conscious sense. But I learned that I do identify with him in the dimension of mythology, in the experience of identity formation (the forced choice). In < Derrida at the LIttle Bighorn > I found a message left for whomever had eyes or ears to read it: *FICEL* (anagram of the letters of the companies of cavalry under Custers immediate command). The authors of the tourist guide to the battlefield marked the site of the Last Stand with these letters, showing the final positions of the troops. I immediately recognized the term as important to LacanUs theory (*ficelle*). I also noted that Henry James used the term in a different way in his writings on the novel: for James, *ficelle* referred to supporting characters whose presence in the story was motivated by the needs of the form (expendables, one might say). As I learn how to read/interpret my own story--or rather, as students of the life story might say--as I continue to rewrite it, I am beginning to see that the James version of the term is as important as Lacans. Look to the minor characters, is what it says-- follow the displacements away from the superego figure to the ficelles of the superego. Who else is in the whole diegesis of the scene? Gall for example. Chief Gall. Or, in < Yellowstone Desert > the Dietrich character. Or it may be an object or prop--look away from the action of the anecdotes to notice the gravel washer thrashing away in the background. Displacement and condensation: conduction. With this map if I want to I may education my judgments, take my superego to school. The map shows me not only my own position (as colonialist etc) but also the territory (the paradigm, the set of possibilities, the others who are also positioned) and this very articulation opens up the possibilites for overcoming the differends of judgment.

Yet, is the superego a necessary element of subjectivation? The answer has to be no. It is as literate and modern as critique (it is the incorporation of critique). What is too patriarchal and conservative for an electronic apparatus is selfhood, of which psychoanalysis is one of the best accounts we have. The three throwings Jim observed so well (the blood on the sail etc.) connote something here. One of the pleasures of mystoriography is to see the pattern of fate, style, identity in ones existence. I did not put the throwings into HEURETICS, but they were there when I finished. Actually there is one more: The AIM leader also throws the mannikin of Columbus off the prow of the replica--the mannikin that stood just where my son Tyson stood on his Sunday in the museum tableau. Jim implies that DASEIN--the very mood grounding and mediating my encounter with reality--is performed in these scenes. That line of interpretation is very promising. As I understood it during the writing, the blows I want to receive (to be affected by at the level of intuition and judgment) are wounds that weaken the hold of selfhood on my subjectivation. Does what I just wrote make any sense?

What is controversial about poststructuralism is its account of the ends of man (the end of the humanist subject). Grammatology puts that end of humanist selfhood in the context of the apparatus to try to think the transformation of subjectivation within the matrix of technology and institutional practices. The *self* in these terms is fundamentally a construct of a certain literate apparatus. Chororography is a way to map the construction of the self within the symbolic order (institutional discourses). No determinism here since the theory also indicates that the behaviors of subjectivation have to be invented in the same way as the other elements of the apparatus.

4. Now comes the final question about the politics of < Yellowstone Desert >. Even if it were reactionary according to some standard of evaluation that we might agree on, would this preclude its effect from being something other (depending on the RECEIVER?) For example, consider the case of NEUROMANCER. One of the most interesting points in the collection edited by Michael Benedikt, CYBERSPACE, concerns the dissemination of that concept (cyberspace). The term and vision of cyberspace originate in NEUROMANCER which, as the essayists agree, is a teenage boys wet dream--the adolescent (or simply heterosexist masculinist?) fantasy of getting inside a supercharged female body without losing ones own distinct corporeal identity as a male and being able to experience everything from both sides of the sexual divide simultaneously. Hmmm. Tiresias? Anyway, what cyberspace is becoming as a technology and as an institution and as the behaviors of subjectivation is not necessarily limited to the ideological construct that motivated its creation. Or is it? Are we not dealing with a *pharmakon*?--no guarantee nor any possibility of assuring the better will exclude the worse? My provisional conclusion is that the nature of invention is such that creativity draws on the whole person--sexist or saint or whatever. And this is the risk (still an adventure) of heuretics. Maybe there is a reason why our schools are so uncreative?

My self-assessment is that I am a ficelle in this story, and that is for the best. A minor character. GREG ULMER

(I am falling behind in my answers; meanwhile this process allows other answerers, as has already started happening. Excellent).

============================

Date: Sun, 18 Sep 1994 16:30:21 -0400 (EDT)
From: Jim McFadden
Subject: REINVW jmcf-> glu, et al: Why write critique?

From: Jim McFadden (jmcf)

I would like to respond to Greg's response to my query point-by-point in part because his detailed and thoughtful response clarified for me his work and my response to it. But I see a line of reinvw queries in front of Greg as long as the line of planes waiting to take off each hour at the Dallas airport. So I won't write Greg directly except to thank him for the time and value of his reinvw here on PTc as we work to explore the possibilities in the epparatus. I follow his sugestion and Paula Gillespie's contribution, then, and write outwardly after reflection on the reinvw.

Assuredly, Greg, I do not know anyone, including myself, whose behavior does not contradict their words, but anyway I want to respond to your characterization of "respected folks" who

declare themselves to be < with the homeless in the streets > (etc) but who do nothing other than publish disciplinary books about this question. It is just too easy to say such things, if nothing follows from it other than the improvement of ones own career. It does not make what is said less true in itself, but it raises the specter [specter of Schema L?] of the right hand not knowing what the left hand (or brain) is doing.
_____ Is their actually something mistaken about just publishing disciplinary books about this question given the resolve those books can contest? Are we all to give up our pens and keyboards for ladles?

I have thought for a few years now about a point that Greg makes in his response to me, which seems a stock reply to stock arguments in my query. I suggest making here what I wish would become or may well already be a further stock argument.

From 1982 to 1991, at least (the terminal date seems fuzzy to me), I worked full-time as a volunteer for five years and as a paid worker for four years in a expanding series of volunteer and professional social welfare organizations, crisis agencies, emergency shelters, long term shelters, glass houses, half-way homes, safe houses for sexually exploited children, child abuse investigative services, etc. I got involved in that work because I admired Mitch Snyder's work in Washington D.C. To support myself during much of that time I worked four hours a night 10-2 am in bakeries, coffee houses, and shoestring catering companies, one of which I owned and used to employ transients after prison release and addicts after hospitalization. It worked out that we ate where we worked and slept often in rooming houses or shelters. I soon became recognized in the local social welfare community as a volunteer (one among many such) who would sit up all night in the shelters and answer the lines when it was least safe to be doing so, although we volunteers often buddied up. I have been one who sat in bed with addicts and held them through days and nights of sweaty withdrawal without asking for sex or pay. I can not count the number of assaults by psychotics, the set fires, the feces on walls, the reports to police, or the thefts of personal property from my homes that all come with the territory.

In the last year of paid full-time work I worked as a child abuse investigator in the downtown area of a major US city. In that post I did a good deal of family advocacy work in local courts. My current reflection on my experience disagrees with Greg's critique of "respected folk" who write critical books and don't get into the kitchens or the shelters, etc. I think Greg voices a popular "Schema L" critique that is part of a stock cultural critique made against liberal authors: They write but do not feed the hungry, etc.

In the last year or two of my long sabbatical from this discipline, I spent a great deal of time with violent and sexualized families, [as if there were any other kind, right.] rich and poor, a lot of sexual transgression, a lot of acting out against one another. When we went to court, I appeared either as advocate for the family, for the mother, or advocate for the child (often against family alliances). I needed relationships with the families and the courts, but easily as much I needed voluminous arguments. I needed huge bibliographies. More so I needed a well perpetuated and maintained progressive or feminist discourse, in the Foucaultian sense of the term. I needed a body of liberal knowledge in print about local systems of representation, about systems of oppression that were well studied over long periods of time. I needed liberal texts from law, linguistics, feminism, systems theory, in short, from all disciplines that could critique the roles involved, to the police, to the judges, to the attorneys, to the families, and to the advocates. I needed research that critiqued local systems of resource distribution and systems of identity construction (like "Schema L" discourses) that were all at work against humans locally.

I found that critical texts which located national history in the locally specific context were most helpful. How did the 1981 Omnibus Budget Reconciliation Act effect the city, the neighborhood, this family, and the local courts? How did the local sense of boosterism change after Nixon's Federal Revenue Sharing funds were withdrawn from this or that family's neighborhood? How is this family constructed as a site of public aggression made private?

We know, for example, that CRIP is the Nixon era acronym for one of the development projects Nixon's federal revenue sharing programs helped to install in LA. We know that a populist neighborhood leader organized a neighborhood center in LA and called it Community Resources for an Independent People--CRIP. LA newscopy records the group's active resistance to city hall's transgressive support of "slum landlords," of inadequate trash removal, of inopportune highway and public transport planning, etc. We have the copy and the photos of hundreds of neighbors at the CRIP neighborhood center shouting their resistance to local government systems that they insisted worked against them.

In those pictures and records we can see what we might call organized resistance, active identification with group action for group interests. We also have record of the sudden withdrawal of federal funds at the city's, actually many cities', insistence. We have copy on the neighborhood alliances organized when the neighborhood center opened. And we have the oral history from the people who used the neighborhood center, again, called Community Resources for an Independent People, who at the time, called themselves CRIPs happily, joyfully, in celebration of their anger, new power, and the center. Today we have the ironic inheritance of that withdrawal of federal support from the neighborhood center closed inone versioon of the story by the loss of financial support. Today, "Schema L" discourses have taught some of us to hear CRIP in that same tone that haunted the ears of city hall before the center failed.

What a difference a local leader with a building can make. [You remember the slogan "Make a differance"?]

But the story, maintained outside the academy by the CRIPs, portrays the systematic support of certain kinds of families by certain kinds of discourses and the consequent, irregular, and rare support of other human needs in other kinds of families. That disfiguration is a function of popular or "Schema L" discourses, ones that have my son standing somewhere quite back from the prow of the ship. Two weeks into kindergarten and he is for the first time ashamed of the color of his mother's skin and already confused about his own.

My own liberal guilt for the civil expense of even this appartus I write in right now must not keep me from the addicts and homeless men I am working with in my neighborhood today, although they need more time than I am able to give them and I no longer bring them into my home where my son needs to play safely. But I now realize how dire the situation is perhaps in part because liberals are swayed from the production of liberal knowledge, driven from the production of critique, leaving unchallenged the local systems of representation that throw a conservative, often culturally popular and individualist, now "Schema L," boosterism onto the object and subject of disciplinary study. Are "Schema L" discourses to be entrusted with their own critique? Under what regime do we come to believe that a more wholistic, (hence modern?), portrait of "one's" cultural position will by itself fail to perpetuate and maintain the historic silences that it has always claimed to transcend? What is the sound of blood hitting a sail?

Christopher Columbuses swam briefly toward Key West this week after Floridian's in speed boats upset their rafts of barrels and logs. Christophers flooded the Rio Grande, wading north not to annex Taylor's or Cross's surname and mourn their arrival in language but to eat in the lush valleys of their lost homeland and to breathe upwind less sulfurously. What is their relation with the sullied image of discovery mourned on the Minnesota museum floor? Like hatcheted Haitians found at dawn dried-blood-stuck to the curb too long in deprivation and hunger's dizziness to outrun the knife?

Real quick: Eight years ago I spent three years with a young addict almost daily on the street & in my home, part of the family and small business. Talked him into treatment, aftercare, outpatient, maintainance. Now he's a young attorney, clean, no shakes, no drugs, no longer so directly violent against women (?) (o pain). His conservativism is extreme, this new Columbus, probably always was I guess, after all, he says to me now, he pulled himself up into the American dream from the nightmare.

"Anyone can."

Today, he is having a conservative impact on local interpretation of community standards against the right to freedom of speech [not porn] in his community. Certainly, the community is safer with him clean. And I love him and would do it with him again. But the resources, the liberal books I need to inform my debate with him are too often too arcane to give him. Too rarely are those books informed, sustained critique of the local particulars he addresses. They are too often too mute of a discourse to be heard, even too self-critical to be credited in court.

Books like Discourse and Discrimination on local representation of MOVE in Pennsylvania and Linda Gordon's Heroes of Their Own Lives on local representation of families in Boston can be helpful to liberals in the courts. Such research can help to inform decision making about local resource distribution and also help maintain feminist and liberal discourses at large by their installment and subscription, by their presence in their discourse.

My experience: Liberal knowldege can well inform court decision making and representation, regardless of whether or not the reseacher has been on either side of the shelter soup counter.

For example, a neighborhood here is briefly mentioned in Kozol's Savage Inequalities. The book had an effect on the schools and the courts here. Family advocates successfully employed that voiced knowledge on behalf of their interest in day-to-day neighborhood services.

Today, liberal legal theory about systematic and discoursive systems of oppression employed against gays and lesbians, against the gay couple, and the gay family are having a impact in courts here.

The courts are extending that impact to reform the behavior of the police. Even on a.m. radio some former victims of police violence here say they feel safer when in the courts and with the police here because of that liberal knowledge production used in courts.

Guilty liberals, quite like me or not, can not afford to defer our writing and research. We need not be deterred from it by calls to the soup kitchens that are made against our rhetorical power.

Jim McFadden
jmcfadden@miavx1.acs.muohio.edu

============================

Date: Sun, 18 Sep 1994 17:03:47 -0700 (PDT)
From: "frank murray (threeform)"
Subject: Re: REINVW fjm configurations?

_____What repatternings of physical competencies do you foresee coming into focus with the transformation of the literate modern culture into the splattered mental gesticulations of postmodernistic conduction?

When John Kuno taught literacy to tribes north of the Congo in the 1890's, he noticed that as an individual became literate the individual also sustained a loss of physical endurance. At the same time, Conrad's Marlowe, analysing the fall of Kurtz, ascribed the onset of "the horror" to Kurtz's lack of civilizing restraint. Today, those of us physically working in construction understand the dis-aster (extraditing Caputo's sense of the word into kinetics) that a college educated new worker brings to a jobsite. - Years of learning to think second hand shunt and garble natural rhythmic movements.- Meanwhile that ultra watcher of tv, the young urban black, devolves into an early maturing and physically adept sociopathic savage. Towards what configurations (not individually, but genericly) are we impelled by conduction?

frank murray

eddress:
fmurray@tribnet.com
--Boundary (ID 77nxhXVhOLuuG/uqhbV88w)--

==========================================

Date: Fri, 23 Sep 1994 08:50:59 -0500
From: Geoffrey Sirc
Subject: REINVW gms->glue:materials/methods
To: REINVW@MIAMIU.ACS.MUOHIO.EDU

I've asked this question one way before. I'll ask it another way here, because I think it's important in terms of talking about the potential of Glue's method:

_____What exactly are the ties between material and method?

Materially, the components of Glue's method--personal experience, popular culture, left-leaning ideology, contemporary critical theory--are very much the parameters of CCCC. I never think CCCC gives birth to too much of the new, the impossible, because it seems there's only so much you can do with those materials perhaps. (Even personal experience, which is so often the what's-been-done, not the what's-never-been-done.) Rather than cite the common Audre Lord quote here, how about the uncommon Roxy Music one--remake/remodel. Glue's insistence on the remake is postmodernistically irresistible. But does remaking/remodeling (even deconstructing/reconstructing) ever lead to the needed new buildings? If the new materials aren't there, are new structures possible (even with new methods)?

I think of my class. I think of how the room is so samey for so many of us in there. I try to lead us out, as best I can. Malcolm X helps very often, Snoop Doggy Dogg has been helping lately. I think of a few students--the young, nicely-mannered, tall, good-looking African-American male, wearing the latest Guess or Nautica, trying hard to master the white/power language, but hating it, hating me, even though he really likes me. I think of the fat, acne-scarred kid in the Nine Inch Nails shirt who only comes alive when we talk about the trouble I have with Trent Reznor ("I really love his stuff," I say, "but I really can't stand it." "Trent . . ." he smiles knowingly, and then shakes his head--at what? at me? at Trent? at the old order Trent is trying to bring down? at the new order he'll nebver bring about?). And I think most of all of the young woman who's grunge the way Rita Hayworth would be grunge. Who's in my class as much as she can be, but who rarely says anything and I can't tell you how much I want to hear what she says. I think if she said one thing it would become a pulse strong enough that we could follow it out of this old room into the right room, the room that would let us start figuring out how to get out of this awful modern mess. I strain so hard I can just faintly hear her, I think. And what I hear is a remake, a tape loop of Sonic Youth's version of "Superstar" playing over and over in her head. All through class, whenever I look at her (and after class, whenever I think of her) I hear the chorus: I hear Thurston Moore's creepily echoed voice (a kinder, gentler Bob?), soothing her, taunting her ("Don't you remember you told me you loved me baby? Said you'd be coming back again, oh baby? Baby baby baby baby, oh baby . . ."), like the voice in Karen Carpenter's head must have soothed her and taunted her until she couldn't take it anymore, until she just withered away--a National Enquirer horror-image and then poof, she was gone. I can't help but see bad patterns repeated by remakes, over and over the same sad stuff. Am I missing something?

Geoff Sirc

=======================================================

Date: Fri, 23 Sep 1994 13:55:52 -0400 (EDT)
From: Greg
Subject: REINVW glue ->gms et al: Credibility
To: reinvw@miamiu.acs.muohio.edu

_____What is the credibility of an English/Language Arts becoming electronic within the present institutional configuration of disciplines?

Sorry for the delay in my posts. Perhaps the deferral allows time for reflection; a leisurely pace. Why be in a hurry in any case; let the time of understanding work over a series of questions that cut to the heart of this complex moment.

A number of the questions are getting at a similar issue from different angles: the intra- and inter- institutional status of a heuretic pedagogy. I will address this issue in several parts, beginning with the university institution and the internal relations of English and the humanities with the other divisions of knowledge. I also apologize for the rather dry style of these answers so far, which I rationalize with the idea that we are establishing a kind of FAQ for a grammatological heuretics.

1. Anecdote. When the powers-that-be who negotiated the IBM grant to Florida of a computer lab decided to dedicate it to the teaching of writing, everyone was surprised. The reps of IBM had in mind a lab for sciences, or at least for technical writing. One of the stipulations of the grant is an evaluation process designed to show that the lab actually improves students performance. The methodology for the evaluation in the original version of the grant called for a comparison of sections (a control group taught in the usual way, compared with a class taught in the lab). Each teacher participating in the test would teach two sections--one in a normal classroom and one in the lab. Identical essays would be assigned. Papers from the two classes will be mixed together and evaluated by an outside reader not participating in the program. The expected outcome is that the papers rated higher by this reader would turn out to be by students in the lab.

From the point of view of grammatology this test is seriously flawed. What the theory predicts--that writing in an electronic environment will not be better or worse than that produced with print practices, but *different*--has been verified by reports from teachers working in networked labs using pedagogies not influenced by poststructuralism. New conventions and practices adapting to the screen as the support for writing are emerging in these labs--conventions that make the writing legible and intelligible on a screen but that, when printed out and compared with an essay composed for paper, are less effective.

When the comp teachers at Florida were finally brought into the process and introduced to this < gift horse >, we pointed out the problems with the proposal and offered a counter-proposal: that we have a responsibility to help IBM understand what it *really* wants (as opposed to what it thinks its wants). What it really wants is a workforce/citizenry prepared to operate effectively in a computerized world, which is coming to be something quite different from a print world. The computer is not ultimately a paper-based machine (the transition of the Mac from a computer designed to print-out to an AV machine is one sign of this evolution).

We have to resist the pressures coming from other institutions and instead apply what our discipline knows (or what grammatology knows, for me) to the design and implementation of a computerized humanities. The immediate result, in our case, is that the test has been changed. While sticking with the comparison of standard/lab classes, the testers--instead of deciding in advance what is expected--will compare outcomes whatever they are, letting the design of the course determine the product rather than the assessment tool.

2. _Cognitive Jurisdiction / Debtor-Creditor Disciplines_

Geoffs question concerned how other disciplines might judge us if we pursue a heuretic pedagogy. Would choragraphic design seem crazy to our colleagues?

_____What is our responsibility to the other disciplines in the university?

These other disciplines are in the position of the IBM representatives. English is a servant to the sciences, in the present CONFIGURATION. We wear our methodology-and-object- of-study organization as a kind of *livery* that allows us to mix with our betters. Not that our service is not appreciated (even if not valued). English is the interface course that teaches access to the apparatus of literacy (print technology, school practices codified in our handbooks, and indoctrination in humanistic values). What we teach in composition--use of the library, strategies of research, argumentative logic, formal organization etc--constitute the tools and craft of learning in all divisions of knowledge, to the extent that English is the language of instruction and the book and library the means of storage of knowledge in all disciplines. We can and should continue to serve these needs, as long as they are relevant to the current organization of collective memory.

At the same time, we should begin to invent the electronic replacement for print literacy. We are now talking about the most controversial and even IMPOSSIBLE features of grammatology (the most difficult to accept or even to perceive). The very organization of the institutions of school and of disciplines (not the same thing) into specializations is part of the print apparatus response to the information explosion of which it is the cause. The institutional formation of majors, departments, general education versus specialization, discipline identification and the like are necessary not in relation to learning, knowledge, application as such but in relation to the print apparatus. As the apparatus begins to change, the justification for the current arrangements comes into question.

In the current institutional circumstances, English is a colonial subject of the sciences (to continue this analogy). Our practices ape a positivistic model of knowledge to the extent that we have accepted that view of ourselves in our desire for Cartesian clarity, univocality, unequivocality, nonambiguity of intention, complete transfer from sender to receiver of a fully intelligible meaning. (Here is the question of dense or elitist style etc that I will treat in a separate post) These are not the features of our object of study (the arts) but of our methodology (borrowed social science). Symptom: student behavior--the reading of Cliff Notes preferred to the reading of literature, since what is tested and evaluated tends to be information about the arts. Nor is the answer a retreat into disciplinary creative writing, dominated by a romanticism that rejects theory and method as killers of the muse.

Rather, the challenge of heuretics is to commit ourselves to the oddities of natural language in all its living usage and the poetic or aesthetic resources of the arts as constituting the CALCULUS of the humanities. Heuretics is an attempt to design a pedagogy and curriculum that researches culture wholistically from within the quotidian and aesthetic resources of language arts. In short-- figuration, metaphor and metonymy, CATACHRESIS, and the rest. The natural and social sciences are right to use the methodologies of mathematics to investigate the physical and cultural (collective) worlds. But as the philosopher said, we may solve all the physical or material problems of life and still not have touched the human question. Figuration (shorthand for image, story, analogy, metaphor, rhythm, etc) is our mathematics. Hence the indirectness of choragraphy (a pedagogy that puts teacher and student inside of story and image without leaving method behind).

In the new epistemological circumstances of POSTMODERNISM, some groups within the natural and social sciences have recognized the poetic or aesthetic foundation of their disciplinary methodologies. The poststructural turn within certain sciences (or at least within the history and philosophy of science) has motivated a shift in the status of letters and arts from debtor to creditor disciplines (potentially) in that the *mysteries* of figuration and design are suddenly irreducibly relevant to the computerization of knowledge. What we have to offer these revolutionary scientists is not the pale reflection of their own (former?) prejudices about natural and aesthetic language, but precisely what until now it has tried to avoid--figuration and the emotional body that goes with it. In this new situation arts and letters slough off the livery of discipline to become not only the interface practice that it currently is as a service discipline, but as well a practice within the sciences. In effect, this adaptation of aesthetics and poetics into the sciences repays the debt the humanities owes to the sciences for our present methods. This reversal of flow is merely a symptom of much larger transformations of the institutional arrangements of learning that the theory predicts are coming. Meanwhile, those colleagues Geoff and others mention who hold English to the practices of literacy and condemn our experiments may be recognized as the equivalent of theologians who demanded from Renaissance logicians a scholasticism that the new science made irrelevant to the emergent paradigm.

In the entertainment institution of popular culture, the exploitation of the emotional body left out of school is everywhere in evidence. Or rather, we are expected to think with our emotional bodies, those being the addressees of fashion, advertising, commercial entertainments, and propaganda of all kinds, all of which ignore the first dictate of school handbooks: avoid logical fallacies. The lesson of the history of critique is that intellectual training in logic leaves untouched the emotional effects of discourse. The division of labor that assigns cognitive jurisdictions--that gives intellectual education to the school and emotional education to entertainment and treats the family as a private sphere--has reached a point of diminishing returns, if not complete dysfunctionality. But that brings us to the interinstitutional dimension of grammatology, which is the subject for a separate post.

GREG ULMER

===============================================

Date: Fri, 23 Sep 1994 18:04:12 -0500
From: linda adler kassner
Subject: reinvw question re: method la-k
To: reinvw@miamiu.acs.muohio.edu

_____How will this new method help us (as researchers and participants in discourse), our students, and other writers move to a different, more "democratic" ideology?
There are two parts to this:
1) Computers and hyperspace, central to this new method, _are_ a new medium (see Ulmer, 28-29), but come from a hegemonic culture/ideology. _____Can we ever completely escape this culture/ideology when we use products that come from it? (For ex.: the "logic" of computing, from the way a screen is set up to the drive paths through which data travel, reflect the culture from which the technology comes...)

2) _____How will this method address/change the content of discourse, rather than just the form in which it's addressed? Language itself, not just the forms that language takes when it's inserted into discursive conventions, is value-laden (see, for example, Voloshinov, trans. 1986; Hall).

Linda Adler-Kassner
University of Minnesota
General College
612/625-6383

==================================================
Date: Mon, 26 Sep 1994 12:44:07 -0500 (CDT)
From: Richard Smyth
Subject: REINVW RS->GMS CHEMICAL ARCHITECTURES
==================================================

Geoff (?) identifies or employs an architectural method in his most recent posting: "if new materials aren't there, are new structures possible?"

My sense of what "glue" does in HEURETICS is to identify fundamental elements of language usage/textual production in the same way that the periodic table does in chemistry: the CATT(t), the pop cycle are the charts. they organize the elements of discourse/theorizing in the same way that the periodic table assembles like kinds of elements (gases to the right, heavy metals to the left, etc.). HEURETICS does to these to these elements of textuality what my colleagues in the physical/biological sciences do with the elements of matter (recognize this structure?): they are recombining in order to create new molecular hybrids, then testing these out in laboratory conditions to see if they are stable, if and how they interact w/other compounds, etc.

i would argue, therefore, that the kind of "remake" glue refers to should not be confused w/ the typical form that many "remakes" take in the entertainment industry--to repeat geoff, "bad patterns repeated by remakes" or, as I see it, the same old thing w/heavy bass guitars and lots of power amps.

i see his sense of remake as equivalent to these chemical manufacturing of hybrid structures.

i have found this chemical metaphor to be useful in thinking about the invention of new genres for the electronic media (ulmer calls his "mystory" and "choragraphy," I call mine "rhizography"). this list in itself demonstrates how the electronic writing space allows for different kinds of texts--here, the fusion of review w/interview. i would point out the visual metaphor underlying these literate modes and suggest, in the spirit of APPLIED GRAMMATOLOGY, that we set about doing this by allowing the metaphor of the "chemical senses" (smell,taste) to shape the way we participate in this discourse. if ulmer is right when he reads derrida as identifying the visual metaphor of cognition, if ulmer offers us an alternative to this in mystory and choragraphy, then how can we begin to incorporate such electronic genres into our disciplinary discussions (e.g. this very list?).

in other words, how can this discussion itself become a choragraphy? is collective choragraphy possible?

Richard Smyth
Hamline University
rsmyth@piper.hamline.edu

==============================================
Date: Tue, 27 Sep 1994 22:14:59 -0400 (EDT)
From: Greg
Subject: REINVW glue ->nop: Questioning deconstruction
To: reinvw@miamiu.muohio.edu
==============================================

_____What is the usage of deconstruction in heuretics?

Nicholas picks up on the vexed relationship between grammatology, deconstruction and heuretics. In APPLIED GRAM I insisted on distinguishing grammatology from deconstruction in order to take up an aspect of Derrida that interested me more than did Yale School criticism--the history of writing. Some Derrideans were quite critical of this move and asserted that Derridas work is all of a piece, whereas I was saying that there were at least two operations--one conventionally philosophical in form, method, and argument (however bold the themes), and the other experimental in every way (GLAS et al). The history of writing is a very large cross-disciplinary field to which Derrida contributes in a fascinating way, while deconstruction is a notion more specific to Derrida, fascinating in its own way regarding the phenomenon of dissemination (how ideas arise and spread).

Within the history of writing Derrida remotivates several things that I explored in turn, such as the metaphor of writing itself. This strategy (heuristic) of following the metaphor has been called deconstructive. The treatment of the metaphor of < the frontiers of knowledge > in HEURETICS I thought of as deconstructive. Derridas references to institutions reflects his awareness of writing as an apparatus including technology, institutions, and human subjects, all of which have to be taken into account. He has focused on Philosophy as an institutional practice in this sense, and much of his politics is of the same sort as the political art of conceptual artists, say Hans Haacke for example, whose exhibitions are critiques of art as institution (the gallery system, the economics of art etc). Haacke deconstructs the exhibition practice. For me this means Haacke, or Derrida, work immanently--they work within the discourse, practice, and use it and explore its possibilities against itself which is not destructive but which remakes the practice. Choragraphy experiments with this deconstructive remake, the ad hocism or concrete science that writes from the position of receiver--not the owner of the press, station, or studio (alluding to GeoffUs question--I will get back to the remake another time). Deconstruction is not hermeneutic (hermeneutics is the contrast in Derridas CATT)

_____How much deconstruction does one have to teach before students can then do it?

Any attempt to < cover > theory is probably hopeless-- the quantity and the nature of the material do not lend themselves to specialization. To try to learn theory in the style of mastery, from the outside so to speak, as a body of knowledge, can be done, but which may leave the master as far away from being a theorist as is the beginning student. Instead, I teach theory as a mode of thought of its own sort, distinct (neither better nor worse) from scholarship. My courses pose some seemingly impossible or irreducible problem derived from the disciplines. The students are challenged to compose a method for solving this problem (for making something that meets the needs of the case). For example, I have used recently the problem of redesigning < dialogue > for the electronic apparatus (to remake the _Phaedrus_). the notion of < remake > is deconstructed in the process (cf. Richard Smyths point) I use the CATT to select the materials, so that theory is only one part of the mix. Students have to work with the theory I assign, along with materials for the other categories, and the goal is not to make them specialists in that theory (eg Derrida) but to undergo the experience of what it is like to think theoretically.

For me theory is precisely not mastery, that feeling of knowing it all (of knowing everything about Derrida) but the opposite--of being perplexed and confused, but because one knows some heuristic ways of working, feeling that it is possible to carry on just the same. This puzzlement requires me to trust to the CATT-- let the readings and relays generate something, the value of which I may then consider based on what I know about the discipline. Students new to theory can do quite well with such a project. At the end of the seminar they have experienced theoretical work (at least as I have framed it) and if they have a taste for it are now motivated to do all the infernal career-long amounts of reading that are in fact necessary. In short, theory does not come at the end of a sequence, as it usually does in hermeneutic pedagogies. In heuretics, one may start with theory because the point is not to be right but to make something. Hence it is useful with undergrads.

The related question is how much < whatever > does one need to know to work with anything in the era of information explosion? The problem is not limited to deconstruction or Derrida. Cultural Studies is an impossible field for example. Despite some claims to the contrary, most of the work I see in cultural studies manifests all the features of academic specialization. Part of Derridas point about institutions has been that progressive fields of study, to the extent that they leave the institutional practices untouched, are merely recuperated. PostColonial, feminism, minority studies, etc, to the extent that they become specializations with all the trappings, exist in a state of contradiction. Again this line crosses GeoffUs questions. The problem of method I am addressing with heuretics, mystory, choragraphy and the like concerns this issue of impossibility--the search for an alternative to specialization. Is there a wholistic way to know, decide, act? The problematic of the popcycle (it has to be invented).

The point is not to leave institutions behind, but how to invent new ones, or new practices for the ones that we have. Meanwhile we could ask some questions about specialization: how much of the information produced within specialization is redundant, empty? How much is produced for administrative reasons? reasons of bureaucracy, management, career (institutional support). If we could zap all that stuff, how much would be left? Yet, without that practice of overproduction we would not have the valuable important things that also exist only because of the institution.

GREG ULMER

===============================================
Date: Wed, 28 Sep 1994 13:57:37 -0400 (EDT)
From: Greg
Subject: PTissues: glue--> autobiographies
To: PTissues@miamiu.muohio.edu
===============================================

I am enjoying very much the autobiographies posted to the list. A great idea for overcoming some of the anonymity of the discussion,. Given that we are working just now in the context of HEURETICS and TELETHEORY, < Derrida at the Little Bighorn > and all, I would be interested in having experimentally inclined folks post or repost their autobios in the mode of mystory.

In brief, mystory is a means to map your position in the circulation of discourses through the popcycle. We all inhabit at least four discourses (institutions)--family, entertainment, school, and discipline. each has its own logic, genres etc (as explained in my books). Locate a problem that interests as formulated in each discourse, enter data reflecting that problem in the style/genres of the discourse. then see what pattern emerges in the accidental punceptual links that occur due to the juxtaposition. is there a superego figure with which you identify in each of the zones? (make you own Mount Rushmore).

Once you locate these patterns they keep popping up like roadsigns to SOUTH OF THE BORDER (if youve ever been through So Carolina). Just the other day I showed HIGH NOON in class as an example of < the movie that changed my life > (Im using the book by that title edited by Roserberg, now out of print I understand). Will Kane is the protagonists name (Gary Cooper). For the next section of the course I showed a documentary on the search for the Atocha (incidentally, turns our Mel Fisher was a chicken farmer in the midwest before he cut loose to follow his dream!) as a metaphor for the creative method. Mels older son Dirk died in an accident during the search, and the younger son carries on and follows a trail of clues that leads finally to the wreck site. The sons name is Kane and they called the trail Kanes trail. I also associated the silver star worn by (and thrown away by) Will Kane with the 40 tons of silver and gold found with the Atocha. Gary Cooper is the superego figure of my Entertainment discourse.

Any experimenters want to give it a try?
all best
GREG ULMER


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